Portable devices and wireless connections are creating a new scenario in which digital information is entering our lives in a massive way. In this article we consider MP3 audiobook applications and propose an approach to completely restyle the applications to the current mobile and multimedia scenario. Our mechanism introduces multimedia contents (images and text) into the audiobook application and synchronizes them with the MP3 audio stream. Multimedia contents are protected by a security system that ensures perfect audio quality and full access to multimedia contents only to a legal user. A distribution architecture and a player that use the proposed mechanism are also presented.
INTRODUCTION
The digital revolution coupled with advances in technology is affecting the way we live and work, but also strongly affects the way we have fun. Nowadays, thanks to the mobile scenario, we can watch a movie wherever we want, listen to hours of music without carrying several audio-CDs, check our email by connecting to a Wi-Fi hot spot while sitting in a coffee shop.
This scenario craves new applications and devices, and the communication industry is proposing to fill the need and attract (or modify the habits of) consumers. Many devices and applications are simply reshaped for the digital world: cellulars, palms, DVD players, CD players, and MP3 players are examples of devices that are part of our lives; while MP3, DVD, email. and the web are applications that entered our lives in a massive way.
In some cases integrating a novel and attractive device and an application creates a desire for the new object. For instance, e-music combined with portable devices is an example of such an integration, and it is changing the music world.
In this article we focus on the digital audiobook application, which is an audio representation of a written book, and may be an interesting application for the mobile scenario. Although, in the early days, sight-impaired people and slow learners were the main users of audiobooks, interest in audiobooks nowadays is growing at an exceptional speed. A variety of people listen to audiobooks for several reasons: frequent readers use audiobooks because they allow "reading" while pursuing other activities; children's audiobooks are also a formidable part of the market, as many families use them for in-car entertainment (not to mention that many teachers use them as educational tools); students and commuters use audiobooks because they can be stored in small portable devices. The growing interest in audiobooks is highlighted by the Audio Publishers Association (APA) [2006] , which estimates the size of the audiobook market at US $800 million. Overall sales growth from 2002 to 2003 is up 5.1 %. It is interesting to look at the revenues of the available audiobook formats (cassette tapes, standard compact discs, MP3 CDs and down-loadable format). Audio tape revenue decreased from 2002 to 2003 (58% to 49%), while the CD sale revenue increased from 35% in 2002 to 45% in 2003. But down-loadable digital format had the largest growth in the audiobook industry: in 2001, down-load sales were US $5,143,000; in 2002, an increase of 112% resulted in US $10,940,000; and, in 2003 , the sales were US$ 18,490,000 (a 69% increase).
The industry is moving from audiobooks to digital audiobooks (e-audiobooks), offering different file formats to consumers (e.g., MP3, WMA, AAC). Both the audiobook industry and consumers can take advantage of these formats. The former may reduce production costs by eliminating manufacturing costs, and the latter may buy and down-load an audiobook wherever and whenever they want for a lower price than any other audiobook format (e.g., The Da Vinci Code costs around $40 on tape/CD, and around $20 down-loaded from the web).
Even though the e-audiobook is a simple audio track, that is, the audio representation of a written book, it nevertheless attracts great interest. Due to copyright and security problems, however, images and text are not provided with the e-audiobook. The industry is hesitant to do so because it considers the digital world nonsecure and perhaps facilitators of piracy. The audiobook file format itself is questioned for security reasons. While users are very happy with open formats (e.g., MP3), audiobook vendors try to impose proprietary formats coupled with digital rights management (DRM) systems. (For example, the audiobook available at the Apple iMusic Store comes wrapped with the Apple DRM system that allows users to play it out on up to five authorized computers.)
The contribution of this article is to restyle digital audiobook applications to make them more attractive and to take advantage of the current mobile and multimedia scenario. In particular, we propose a mechanism that brings multimedia contents (MMCs) into an MP3 audiobook in a transparent and secure way. Thus, as it is coupled with text and images, the MP3 audiobook evolves from a simple audio application to a multimedia audiobook (m-audiobook).
Transparency and security are the main characteristics of our mechanism. Transparency allows us to bring MMCs into the MP3 file without changing the MP3's file structure by describing all the MMCs via a multimedia description language (e.g., MPEG-7 DDL [2006] ; SMIL [2006] ; MECDL [Egidi and Furini 2005] ) and by storing the resulting description into the MP3 file using the textual tags usually associated with MP3 files (e.g., ID3 tags). The resulting description couples timing properties to the book's text (to make it possible to display the written text synchronized with the narrator's voice --a sort of karaoke effect) and to images (which may integrate the narrator's descriptions with the images on screen). Timing properties are also coupled to further explanations (which may appear on the screen for improved understanding) and to links to web sites (to allow a deeper, more informed reading). We secure MMCs from illegal use and distribution by combining different tools like encryption, watermarking, and signatures. This mechanism provides only the legal maudiobook owner with perfect audio quality and full access to the MMCs stored inside the audiobook file. The security mechanism is coupled with a traitor-tracing mechanism to track users who made m-audiobook files publicly available (e.g., on web sites or file sharing systems). Our system does not infringe fair use (as several digital rights management systems do). Security is enforced in a completely transparent way, and thus is not a burden for an honest user. This article's contributions can be summarized as follows: (i) extension of a multimedia description language (MECDL, designed to describe MMCs for e-music) to describe MMCs, tailored to audiobook applications; (ii) design of a security mechanism that protects the MMCs, ensuring the rights of vendors and guaranteeing to an honest user the freedom offered by an open format; (iii) a distribution architecture that produces and delivers the m-audiobook in a networking scenario.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly review current advances in e-music and multimedia content protection; in Section 3 we present characteristics and properties of our approach; and in Section 4 present an analysis of the security features of our approach. Conclusions and future work are presented in Section 5.
PRELIMINARIES
The audiobook industry has always followed the trail created by the music industry, confirmed by fact that several web stores offer audiobooks in electronic format also. For this reason, it is interesting to take a look at the most recent development of the e-music industry and to forecast the next step of the audiobook industry. Hence, we briefly review a proposal to use a multimedia language description to bring MMCs into e-music files. We also briefly review how security tools can be used to protect an m-audiobook from illegal use and distribution. 2.1 e-Audiobooks and e-Music Due to the increasing revenues earned via digital down-loads, it is near certain that there will be a significant format shift in audio publishing in this direction. But it is not yet clear what the digital audio file's format will be. Currently, there are a variety of digital audio file formats, and the most popular are MP3 (MPEG I Layer III), AAC (Advanced Audio Coding), and WMA (Windows Media Audio). To meet the largest demand, many on-line digital audiobook sellers offer two or all three of these formats. All of them can provide high audio quality, but are not designed to store additional MMCs within themselves. Hence, the e-audiobook is a simple audio track, as images and text cannot be stored inside the audio track. This is a limitation that may limit the audiobook to a niche market. Since similar concerns have spurred interesting developments in the e-music world, we take our inspiration from it; hence our goal is to transform the e-audiobook into a multimedia rich product. A recent proposal from the e-music world aims to bring multimedia contents into MP3 files, without affecting the MP3 file size and MP3 compatibility [Egidi and Furini 2005] . This mechanism would allow insertion of new multimedia contents like a karaoke-like service, images, covers, and updated information into an MP3 file. Towards this goal, the multimedia contents are first described by a multimedia description language (MPEG7-DDL, SMIL, or the MECDL proposed in Egidi and Furini [2005] ); the resulting description is then stored in a transparent way in the MP3 file. Users with an MMC-aware player can enjoy the music as well as additional content (e.g., a karaoke-like service). Users who do not have an MMC-aware player cannot enjoy MMCs (but can only listen to the audio). In fact, the security mechanism protects only the MMCs, and not the audio stream, which is given to the final user without any protection. An interesting study has also been carried out comparing MPEG-7 DDL, SMIL, and MECDL. The study was related to MMCs associated with e-music, and shows that MECDL provides shorter MMCs descriptions than MPEG-7 DDL and SMIL [Egidi and Furini 2005] . For this reason, and although MECDL has to be expanded in order to describe audiobook MMCs, we consider it the language to use in describing MMCs for the e-audiobook.
As well as other multimedia description languages, MECDL describes multimedia contents via textual information and allows linking external media with the MP3 file, so that they can live independently of each other. MECDL is not case-sensitive; it adds multimedia contents and timing capabilities to the MP3 file using tags with attributes and values. The tags are enclosed between angle brackets in the form <tag attribute = value>, with the exception of tags that do not have attributes. Table I summarizes the MECDL tags. 
Digital Rights Management
An important consideration in the distribution of any digital content is copyright protection. Up to some years ago, the law, along with practical and economic barriers, was considered sufficient to protect publishers and authors from piracy. Within the digital world these non-legal barriers no longer exist. As a consequence, many vendors use digital rights management (DRM) systems to protect the digital media. These security mechanisms allow wrapping a media file with a control mechanism that enforces some limitations (for instance, the DRM system may limit the number of possible copies or impose usage over a particular device), and discloses the material only to authorized users. Encryption, code authentication, and information hiding are the key components of a typical DRM system. Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of steps taken by the content provider and by the user in a DRM system. We discuss each step in the following sections. However, it is worth noting that although employed extensively, DRM systems have some limitations, as they do not admit final and provable solutions, as we describe in the following.
2.2.1 Encryption. The basic tool that DRM systems use is the encryption of the content that must be protected. Encryption is carried out with typical symmetric-key encryption algorithms. For play-out, contents must be in the clear, so the cryptographic key must be available to the software player. But contents in the clear must never be available to users in order to avoid unauthorized usage or distribution. Hence protection is effective as long as the user can't retrieve the key from the software and can't capture the unencrypted data while the player outputs them to the audio card. Hence, hardware and software access to sensitive data must be properly regulated.
Code and Component
Authentication. To avoid key retrieval, all the processes authorized to handle sensitive cryptographic data and the data stream in the clear must be cryptographically checked for integrity (this prohibits the use of user-controlled code). In particular, the core DRM software must run at kernel level, and its integrity should be checked at boot time, preferably by some secure hardware component. This yields a trusted basis on which all DRM operations can depend. Additional protective measures include (e.g., [Bar-El and Weiss 2004] ) disabling debugging and dumping the memory of privileged software, an integrity check of any dynamic library that a privileged process attempts to load, authenticating code only after it has been loaded to RAM (to avoid race condition attacks). Moreover, n order to avoid capture of protected contents, hardware that handles data streams in the clear must also be authenticated (cf., Micorsoft's Secure Audio Path [Microsoft Windows 2006] ).
Individualization.
Another important role in a security mechanism is played by individualization of the software player, and consequently of the contents' release. It aims at hindering unauthorized sharing of contents between users and minimizing the effects of a key compromise (e.g., Microsoft Windows [2006] ). Typically, the player is bound either to the machine on which it runs (exploiting some unique device identifier like the IMEI, International Mobile Entity Identification on GSM phones), or to the user (e.g., via reading a collection of marks, usually called a fingerprint).
Individualization has the advantage of helping expose the source of illegal distribution, and therefore works as a deterrent. On the down side, it also works against users' privacy (as most security measures do).
Information Hiding.
Most DRM systems hide information inside the audiofile by using watermarking techniques [Cox et al. 2001] . The inserted information (called a watermark) is hidden, imperceptible, and directly connected to the audio stream (i.e., is spread out in the music file). In addition, a watermark should be statistically invisible (users should not take advantage by comparing different watermarked copies), be robust against signal processing operations (it cannot be removed by simple manipulation of the audio file: for instance, compression or digital-analog-digital conversions), and tamper resistant (it should be impossible to alter/identify/remove the watermark as well as to insert a valid watermark for an un-authorized person).
Watermarking algorithms typically use a secret key to generate a random sequence during the embedding process. The watermarking key is also used to extract the watermark. If the watermarking scheme is statistically invisible, robust, and tamper resistant, extracting and altering a watermark would be hard with no knowledge of the watermarking key.
2.2.5 Traitor Tracing. Information hiding also allows the implementation of a traitortracing scheme. Although not an actual security mechanism, such a scheme works as a deterrent because it allows identification of the illegal distributors of right protected material. In this case the hidden information consists of a collection of marks, i.e., a fingerprint.
Depending on the properties wanted, a traitor-tracing scheme can be symmetric (it cannot supply undeniable evidence of the traitor's treachery [Pfitzmann and Schunter 1996] , so that the accused can always defend himself by claiming that he was framed); asymmetric (supplies undeniable proof of the traitor's guilt [Pfitzmann 1996] ); or anonymous (user identification is possible only by involving a trusted third party (TTP) [Pfitzmann and Waidner 1997] , is that DRM systems must limit the availability of protected data to untrusted environments (the playout device is under the user's control). The security, effectiveness, and desirability of DRM systems are discussed in a broad and interesting survey paper in Biddle et al. [2002] .
Watermark and fingerprinting techniques are subjects of a never-ending debate. The biggest threat that fingerprinting faces is removal or alteration of the marks. Typically, this is done by using multiple copies of the same track containing different fingerprints. The fingerprint is altered by averaging the copies (e.g., He and Hu [2004] ). On the basis of a specific attack proposed in their article, Schonberg and Kirovski [2004] claim that secure collusion-resistant fingerprinting is not possible with current technology; but He and Wu [2004] are much more optimistic. Far from trying to settle the dispute, we simply note that the DVD-audio is protected by a fingerprinting scheme, designed by Verance [2006] , which seems to be unbroken to date [Audioholics 2005] .
A final, different issue, is the unauthorized detection of watermarks. For the purposes of this research, it must be possible to devise watermarking schemes such that the embedded data is difficult to read. This property is called secrecy [Li and Yu 2000] . From an abstract point of view, it is clear that if a watermark can be read, it can be modified. So robustness of a fingerprinting technique implies the secrecy of the underlying watermarking scheme. Yet technically invisibility is a goal that conflicts with robustness; this issue is addressed [Li and Yu 2000a; 2000b] , showing that it is possible to achieve a high degree of robustness with good transparency properties and a significant capacity for information hiding.
Liability and Forensics
A DRM system limits unauthorized use of contents. If it enforces individualization, it also makes it difficult to produce illegally altered copies that can be used by others. Still this doesn't provide a strong guarantee either to the content provider or to the user. In particular, if content allegedly distributed by the provider is found to be unacceptable, both parties must be able to prove before a court whether it is actually the content originally distributed by the provider or the product of an illegal alteration.
The classical solution to this problem is that of digital signatures in the framework of a public key infrastructure (with a trusted certification authority to release public-key certificates). In our application, in which the data stream is individualized with watermarks, digital signatures must be made oblivious to non-perceptual variations in the stream. Since it is not wise to modify the well-understood (and legally accepted) digital signature schemes, the data stream can be preprocessed using perceptual hash functions.
Perceptual hash functions are secure hash functions 1 that are also robust to the manipulations of an audio bit stream and don't alter audio quality (watermarking, format change, compression type modifications) [Mihcak and Venkatesan 2001] .
Perceptual hash functions are also useful for watermarking schemes that choose the watermark destinations based not only on a key but also on the stream in which data is to be embedded. The above scenario is just an example of the benefits that m-audiobooks can provide users (think of learning disciplines where connections between words and images will help the child learn new words or new facts), but it highlights the potentiality of an maudiobook.
In this section we show how an m-audiobook can be created by using a classic eaudiobook. In summary, our goal is to introduce images and written text synchronized with the audio in such a way that the consumer can also (i) follow what the narrator is saying by reading the text that appears on the screen; (ii) watch images that can describe what the narrator is saying; (iii) increase his/her knowledge by reading additional information; and (iv) receive clues about some possible external documents (e.g., links to websites).
To avoid the proliferation of files and to make the use of audiobooks over portable devices simple and immediate, our mechanism inserts all the previous features into a single audiobook file (in this article we use the MP3 file format). The insertion process must meet the following constraints: (i) transparency (the input file format must be the same as the output file format); (ii) ease (the input and output file sizes should differ only slightly); (iii) security (multimedia content must be protected against piracy).
In the following we present an extension of the MECDL language that will allow us to meet the transparency and ease requirements. We also show how MMCs are protected against piracy, propose an architecture to securely distribute m-audiobooks in a networking scenario, and present a player able to render MMCs to users. 3.1 Extending the MECDL Language MECDL is a multimedia description language that describes MMCs for e-music [Egidi and Furini 2005] . When compared to SMIL and MPEG-7 DDL, the MECDL language is shown to produce a more compact description, and hence for the ease requirement, we use it to describe audiobook MMCs.
MECDL provides tags and attributes for specifying audio-text synchronization, image rendering, and links to external sources. MECDL allows us to meet the ease requirement, as MECDL does not store images directly (or difficult multimedia content) into the eaudiobook file. Instead, only a link between the e-audiobook and the multimedia content (1) No sharing. It is hard for customers to share the m-audiobook's MMCs, and consequently it is hard to share the product as a whole For example, we assume that the adversary owns an authorized copy of an m-audiobook and has free access to the m-audiobook player for which the m-audiobook was released and wants to play the m-audiobook on another user's (source-released) software player. (2) No theft. It is hard to reproduce audio and MMCs from an m-audiobook that was illegally obtained. For instance, the adversary obtains an m-audiobook but has no access to the player for which it was released. Her aim is to reproduce the MMCs along with the audio. (3) No distribution. It is hard to distribute the m-audiobook illegally. For instance, the adversary owns an authorized copy of an m-audiobook and has free access to the software player for which the m-audiobook was released. She wants to make the m-audiobook available to other users, and to this end writes an alternative maudiobook player. (4) Traitor tracing. In case of illegal distribution the adversary can be traced back. This is an additional security layer to goal (1); if goal (1) fails, the adversary can still be traced. In this case the adversary owns an authorized copy of an maudiobook and has free access to the player for which it has been released. (5) Weak integrity (MMCs only). The integrity of the MMCs can be transparently verified to the user. It is hard to alter the MMCs in a way that is not exposed by this verification. The user is viewed as a victim here, so we assume that the adversary has no access to the user's software player, although she may own a software player released to herself and own m-audiobooks regularly released by the source. Her aim is to change the MMCs in a way undetectable to a (noncolluding) user's weak-integrity verification procedure. (6) Strong integrity. The user can verify the integrity of the audio track and MMCs in a strong sense, so that it is computationally unfeasible to alter the MMCs in an undetectable way. (The assumptions about the adversary and her aims are as for the weak integrity goal above, but refer to a strong integrity procedure). (7) Forensics. When users find that the source has produced offending MMCs, they can present their evidence before a third party. This also implies that false evidence cannot be forged. (We assume that the adversary has access to an maudiobook released by the source and to the m-audiobook player. Her aim is to produce an m-audiobook with an altered audio track or MMCs, such that a third party is convinced that it was released by the source.)
To meet the previous goals, our security mechanism uses the security tools that we reviewed in Section 2: i.e., hash functions, perceptual hash functions, symmetric encryption, signature schemes, and watermarking. As we already mentioned, our security mechanism works in a scenario where the source endows each users with a proprietary software player. In this way, each player may be provided with a specific watermarking key (copies of the software player released to different users use different watermarking keys). The key is hidden in the player's code with suitable software engineering techniques. When releasing a copy of an maudiobook for use on a specific player, the source uses that player's watermarking key to embed information into the audio stream. Only the player that uses that key can retrieve the watermarked data. By using the notation of Table IV, the hidden information is (see Figure 3 ):
for the weak integrity verification;
• K, the symmetric cryptographic key for decrypting E K (MMC 2 );
• α, the symmetric key for decrypting the audio stream;
• F, a fingerprint for traitor-tracing.
In addition to the hidden information, it is necessary to store the MMCs description inside the file. Part of this description is given in unencrypted (MMC 1 ), while the remaining part should be encrypted (MMC 2 ) with a key hidden in the audio stream. To avoid any file structure modification, the comment field ID3v2 is used to store both the unencrypted MMC 1 and the encrypted MMC 2 (i.e., E K (MMC 2 )).
For forensic purposes, in a web site maintained by a music distributor, the signature σ=Sig(PH(audio)||MMC 1 ||MMC 2 ) which binds audio data with unencrypted MMCs, is made available.
Audio Security Control.
To protect audio information, our security mechanism uses encryption. In particular, as depicted in Figure 3 , a key α is hidden in the first portion of the MP3 file and is used to encrypt the second portion of the audio stream. In this way, only a player enabled to retrieve key α is able to decrypt the second audio portion. All the other players can play perfect audio quality up to the beginning of the second audio portion, where they start to produce random noise, as they are not able to decrypt the second audio portion. We allow unprotected reproduction of the first portion of the audio stream (for instance the first 30 seconds of the audio play-out) in order to give to the software player sufficient time to retrieve the decryption key without imposing any delay on the user.
To ensure fair use policy, the player should provide the user with the ability to burn personal copies of the m-audiobook (only the audio is copied and no MMCs are provided). This feature can be useful to those users who may want to listen to the maudiobook over an alternative player (for instance over the MP3 car audio system).
MCMCS Security
Control. In addition to audio protection, it is necessary to stop any unauthorized play-out of MMCs and to expose any illegal alterations of it.
In order to protect MMCs against unauthorized reproduction, we use standard symmetric key encryption. Since we seek transparency to the user, we postulate that the decryption key be embedded as a watermark in the audio stream. Again, a player different from the one for which the copy of the m-audiobook was released will not be able to retrieve the embedded data. As for the audio stream, in order to give the software player sufficient time to check integrity and retrieve the decryption key, without imposing any delay on the user, we allow unprotected reproduction of the first portion of the multimedia contents along with the audio track.
For consumer protection, in the software player we provide a lightweight verification procedure that inhibits play-out if MMCs have been altered. The procedure checks the hash of the MMCs description, against WID, which is watermarked in the initial portion of the audio stream. Note that for performance reasons this verification is simply based on a digest. In fact, since this check is performed by the software player, we want it to be as self-contained as possible (requiring no public-key certificates and no Internet connectivity). Also, since the software player might run on low-end portable devices, computation-intensive operations should be avoided, and hence stronger cryptographic tools should not be used.
However, it is possible to provide strong integrity verification (and therefore forensic analysis) by using a public-key signature with a certified key-pair that binds the audio stream to the MMCs. The signature is publicly available on an accessible directory on the Internet. This scenario makes sense, provided that the digital signature is independent of the specific copy released for a specific player. We obtain independence using perceptual hashing and signing data in the clear. As discussed in Section 2.3, a perceptual hash of the audio stream is computed before signing the data. This way the signature is not affected by the data watermarked in each single copy. Moreover, the content provider signs the audio and MMCs in the clear. We dictate this because a signature on the encrypted data would be dependent on the specific copy of an m-audiobook. Since users have no access to unencrypted audio and MMCs, we add to the software player signature verification functionality. An alternative to playing-out an m-audiobook, and with the digital signature in input, the player can decrypt data, compute the perceptual hash of the audio stream, and verify the integrity of the data.
Traitor Tracing.
In order to discourage attempts at unauthorized distribution of m-audiobooks, or to trace attackers who defeated all other security countermeasures, in the audio track we add a fingerprint that uniquely identifies the user who purchased a specific copy.
We implement an anonymous traitor-tracing scheme in which a trusted third party (TTP) embeds a fingerprint in the second portion of the audio stream. The fingerprint data can be watermarked in the audio stream only before encryption. Indeed, if the encrypted stream were altered, decryption would no longer be possible. Besides, even if a user makes a "personal" copy of the audio stream, as allowed by the fair-use policy, that copy is still marked with the unique fingerprint that identifies the user. In case of illegal distribution of a "personal" copy, the user can still be traced. In order to use fingerprinting for forensic purposes, the content provider must never be shown a fingerprinted copy, otherwise the personalized m-audiobook might be used to frame the user as an illegal distributor. This implies that the content provider cannot insert the fingerprint. Obviously, if the audio fingerprint is used for traitor-tracing purposes, the fingerprint cannot be inserted by the user.
The TTP is assumed to use (in general) a different watermarking algorithm than the content provider and also a secret watermarking key. Notice that in contrast to what happens to the watermarks inserted by the content provider, the TTP's watermarking key is not available to the software player, and the fingerprint is retrieved only in case a copy is illegally found in the wild.
Since the content provider must not be shown the fingerprinted data, the TTP must carry on the final audio encryption.
Distribution Architecture
The use of the MECDL language along with the security mechanism allows the production of an m-audiobook. Three different entities with different tasks participate in the realization of an m-audiobook: m-audiobook production is done by the source and the TTP, which cooperate to produce an m-audiobook with MMCs and hidden information stored inside the MP3 file; m-audiobook distribution is possible thanks to the interactions among the customers, the source, and the TTP; m-audiobook playout is performed at the customer side by a special m-audiobook player.
In the following we present details in the preparation of an m-audiobook.
M-Audiobook Production. MMMC and watermark insertion.
The source assembles the m-audiobook, putting together audio (unencrypted) and MMCs (unencrypted and encrypted). It then embeds weak integrity data (WID), the MMC encryption key (K), and the key α for audio play-out control as watermarks in the first portion of audio data via classical spread-spectrum techniques [Cheng et al. 2002; Cox et al. 1997] . The source also makes strong integrity data available at its web site.
Fingerprint insertion. A trusted third party (TTP) is responsible for embedding in the second part of the audio stream a customer-based fingerprint, for traitor-tracing purposes.
Audio reproduction protection. After inserting the fingerprint, the TTP encrypts the second part of the audio stream using key α. (The TTP must carry out the encryption because the source cannot see the fingerprinted copy.) Then the TTP forwards the finished file directly to the user, since the source must not see it.
3.3.2 M-audiobook Distribution. To increase security, our mechanism employs an anonymous traitor-tracing scheme as a deterrent. This means that the protocol for releasing an m-audiobook to a customer C involves the TTP as well as the source S, and is deployed along the following steps (see Figure 4 ):
(1) C requests an m-audiobook for S, disclosing the ID of his software player; (2) S gives C the data necessary to complete payment and requests that C contact TTP for payment; (3) C contacts TTP, transfers to TTP all necessary data, and payment is completed; (4) TTP informs S that C has paid; (5) S embeds WID, K, and α in the audio stream using the player's watermarking key, adds the MMC's description to the ID3v2 field and forwards the audio stream to the TTP for fingerprint insertion along with the encryption key α; (6) TTP embeds a fingerprint F in the portion of the audio stream following the first 30 seconds worth, and encrypts that portion with the key α. F identifies C uniquely; TTP forwards the resulting m-audiobook to C and informs S that the transaction has been completed. 
M-audiobook Playout.
To evaluate the benefits of an m-audiobook, we developed an m-audiobook reader; Figure 5 shows its graphical interface. A box is dedicated to displaying images, another is dedicated to the karaoke effect, and a third box is used to provide additional information to the listener. Note that all these information are provided in a synchronized way with respect to the audio. The player, while rendering the first portions of the audio stream and of the MMCs that are in the clear, extracts the embedded watermak data WID for weak integrity verification, K for decrypting the remaining MMC description, and α for audio play out control.
After extraction, the player checks the weak integrity by computing
and by comparing it with the retrieved WID. If the integrity check fails, reproduction is interrupted, otherwise the remaining MMCs and the rest of the audio track are decrypted using the retrieved keys (K and α), and reproduction of audio and MMCs continues normally.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the security level achieved by our proposal. First we investigate the overhead introduced by the security mechanism and then discuss the security level attained.
The Security Mechanism's Overhead
The audiobook application is well-suited for portable devices. Hence, it is important to analyze whether the security mechanism can be problematic when handled by portable devices, which are usually provided with reduced processing power and energy reserves. We analyze the processing costs of our software player in relation to the new generation of PDAs and cellular phones. PDAs embed processors whose speeds range between 200 and 600 MHz. NEC is bringing multicore chips with three processors running at 200 MHz on to the cellular phone market [Williams 2004] .
The heaviest task that our mechanism imposes on the end-device is the symmetric decryption of audio and textual data. In their experiments Ravi et al. [2004] show that when fully dedicated to the task a 206MHz SA-1110 processor can sustain a decryption rate of 1.8 Mbps per second, and 180kbps when only 10% is dedicated. So we evaluate the amount of data per second that our software player must be able to decrypt:
• The audio stream is usually processed at 128 to 192kbps (note that we are dealing with audio applications, hence 128kbps is enough to provide high quality).
• Textual data must be displayed at a rate of roughly 3 words per second (this data has been extrapolated from studies on the speed at which subtitles should be displayed to be comprehensible and not too demanding to the average public [Karamitroglou 1998; Ofcom 2005] . Considering an average word length of five characters, this amounts to roughly 120 bits of MMCs that must be decrypted every second -negligible when compared to the 128 to 192kbps of audio.
These results show that the decryption workload of our system can be sustained by new generation PDAs and cellular phones. As for power consumption of cryptographic operations on small devices, the study by Karri and Mishra [2002] analyzes the case of a Symbol PPT2800 PocketPC (with a 11Mbps Spectrum24 wireless LAN card), while busy in an SSL connection, transmitting 64KB of data. Since the device sustaines an SSL connection, this study highlights the processing cost of cryptographic operations. Only 18% of the power consumption is due to symmetric (specifically 3DES) encryption operations. Another detailed study [Potlapallye 2003] shows that an iPAQ 3870 PDA uses only 1.21 µJ/byte for symmetric encryption and decryption using AES (AES is a symmetric cipher that was specifically designed for efficient software implementation).
A final question is how many resources the obfuscation of code will consume. That is, one hypothesis behind any DRM system is that the code to be run on the (untrusted) end-host is obfuscated in order to protect the secrets it carries. A precise answer to this question is not possible in general, since it depends on the specific obfuscation techniques that are used. Yet Apple's DRM system, FairPlay, stipulates that decryption keys be stored in the iPod for play-out of protected tracks. Thus iPod is doing decryption and running obfuscated code (iPod, third generation, features dual 90 MHz ARM 7TDMI processors, a PortalPlayer PP5002 system on a chip [EveryMac.com] ). For completeness, recall that Apple's FairPlay has been broken (see Section 2).
Security
As mentioned in Section 3.2, our security mechanism was designed to achieve seven goals. Here, we investigate whether those goals are met or not. We first state precisely the security assumptions under which we study the system and establish a hierarchy of security levels (SL1, SL2, and SL3) that can be achieved under each assumption; we then analyze the security goals.
• Standard cryptographic assumptions. We assume the existence of cryptographically secure hash functions of a secure symmetric-key encryption scheme and of a secure digital signature scheme. Since by these assumptions it is computationally unfeasible to break the cryptographic schemes mentioned, security properties that are based on them have the highest security level, SL3.
• WM assumptions. We assume a statistically invisible, robust, and tamper-resistant watermarking scheme. Since an adversary that can read watermarked data can change it at leisure, WM assumptions imply confidentiality of watermarked data. Properties that are based on them attain an intermediate security level, SL2.
• Software engineering assumption. Software is protected to the best of the state of the art: only an adversary skilled in reverse engineering will be able to break the protection. Properties that rest on this assumption have the lowest security level, SL1.
Unavoidably, confidentiality based on keyed cryptography is limited by the lifetime of the cryptographic key. This is mitigated by a farsighted choice of keys. Considering the above assumptions, we prove that the security goals in Section 3.2 are met with different levels of security: THEOREM 1. No distribution. The adversary should capture MMC 2 as decrypted by the software player and reuse it in the player she writes for distribution. Since she has access to the software player for which the m-audiobook was released, this is a reverse engineering problem, SL1. (4) Weak integrity. The adversary needs to embed new, weak integrity parameters as a watermark, with no knowledge of the watermarking key (recall that we assume that she has no access to the software player on which it will be reproduced). Therefore, the property rests on the WM assumptions, SL2. (5) Traitor tracing. The adversary must alter the TTP's fingerprint without knowledge of the watermarking key. This implies that the property has level SL2. (6) Strong integrity. This rests on the standard cryptographic assumptions, since it is based on the security of the signature scheme. Hence the security level is SL3. (7) Forensics. This again depends on the security of the digital signature, SL3.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we proposed a mechanism to securely enrich a digital audiobook file with multimedia contents (images and text along with audio), transforming it into a digital multimedia audiobook. The mechanism is coupled with security features that protect the rights of the vendors while guaranteeing the complete freedom of the honest user. The security mechanism is also provided with a traitor-tracing mechanism that can be used as a further feature to ensure the rights of the vendors.
To complete our proposal, we presented a possible distribution architecture that employs a trusted third party to protect both users and vendors from illegal behavior. We also designed an m-audiobook player that can render the (introduced) multimedia contents to the final user.
We showed that the introduction of MMCs into the digital audiobook file can be done in a transparent way (the file structure is not modified) and in a light way (the size of a digital m-audiobook file is slightly bigger than that of a digital audiobook).
The security mechanism is based on standard cryptographic tools, and was shown to protect the rights of the vendors and impose no burden on a legal m-audiobook owner. We showed that our approach provides different security levels, and makes clear the difference between a legal and an illegal m-audiobook copy, so that users are encouraged to avoid piracy.
The simplicity of our mechanism, along with the expansion of portable devices, may find new markets for the audiobook industry in the entertainment and educational worlds.
